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VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
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 Eighty Four Mining Company petitions this Court to 
review the United States Department of Labor Benefits 
Review Board’s decision affirming an award of disability 
benefits to Charles Morris under the Black Lung Benefits Act 
(BLBA), 30 U.S.C. §§ 901–944.  At issue is whether a state 
workers’ compensation board’s denial of pneumoconiosis 
benefits due to the repudiation of the claimant’s black lung 
diagnosis resets the BLBA three-year statute of limitations 
period.  Eighty Four Mining argues that it does not and that 
the Administrative Law Judge and the Benefits Review Board 
erred as a matter of law by granting benefits to Morris.  We 
disagree.  Accordingly, we will deny Eighty Four Mining’s 
petition for review. 
I. 
 The relevant facts are not in dispute.  Morris worked as 
a coal miner for nearly thirty-five years, nineteen of which 
were spent working underground.  His last position involved 
heavy labor, and Morris’s breathing difficulties eventually 
caused him to leave work.  In 2006, Dr. Robert Cohen 
examined Morris and diagnosed him with pneumoconiosis 
(black lung disease).  This diagnosis formed the basis of 
Morris’s state workers’ compensation claim for occupational 
disease benefits.  Eighty Four Mining’s physician, Dr. 
Gregory Fino, also examined Morris, but he determined that 
Morris’s breathing difficulties were caused by smoking.  In 
this regard, Dr. Fino found that there was no radiographic 
evidence of pneumoconiosis, but there was evidence of 
emphysema, a condition caused by prolonged cigarette 
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smoking.1  In a decision dated March 31, 2008, a state 
Workers’ Compensation Judge concluded that Dr. Fino’s 
opinion was more credible than Dr. Cohen’s and that Morris 
“did not sustain an injury . . . in the nature of coal workers’ 
pneumoconiosis or any other pulmonary injury.”  (App. 139.)  
Accordingly, Morris’s claim for workers’ compensation 
based upon pneumoconiosis was denied.  Morris did not 
appeal that decision to the Pennsylvania Workers’ 
Compensation Appeal Board. 
 Morris’s breathing problems subsequently worsened 
and a doctor put him on oxygen nearly full-time.  On January 
6, 2011, Morris filed a claim for BLBA benefits.  He did not 
rely upon the 2006 report of Dr. Cohen that had been 
discredited in the state workers’ compensation proceedings.  
Nor did he rely upon radiographic proof of pneumoconiosis.  
Instead, he relied upon a 2011 arterial blood gas study as well 
as pulmonary function testing that supported a finding of 
black lung disease. Eighty Four Mining opposed the 
application for benefits, contesting that it was barred by the 
statute of limitations because it was not filed within three 
years of receipt of Dr. Cohen’s 2006 report..  Alternatively, it 
renewed the argument it had advanced in the state workers’ 
compensation proceedings that Morris’s pulmonary 
impairment was attributable to cigarette smoking and not due 
to coal dust exposure. 
On July 9, 2013, an Administrative Law Judge 
(“ALJ”) granted benefits under the BLBA.  The ALJ rejected 
the challenge to the timeliness of Morris’s BLBA claim on 
                                              
 1 Morris had been a heavy cigarette smoker, smoking a 
pack and a half of cigarettes per day for approximately 40 
years. 
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the basis of our decision in Helen Mining Co. v. Director, 
Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, 650 F.3d 248 
(3d Cir. 2011) [hereinafter Obush].  In Obush, we held that a 
denial of federal black lung benefits due to the repudiation of 
the claimant’s pneumoconiosis diagnosis renders that 
diagnosis a “misdiagnosis” and resets the three-year statute of 
limitations for subsequent claims.  Id. at 253-54.  Under 
Obush, the ALJ determined that the state workers’ 
compensation board’s denial of Morris’s claim rendered Dr. 
Cohen’s 2006 diagnosis a “misdiagnosis” that did not trigger 
the statute of limitations under the BLBA.  As to the merits of 
the claim, the ALJ determined that Morris sufficiently 
established the existence of pneumoconiosis through medical 
evidence obtained after 2010.  The burden then shifted to 
Eighty Four Mining to rebut a presumption that Morris was 
totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis, either by showing 
that Morris does not have pneumoconiosis or that his 
breathing difficulties “did not arise out of, or in connection 
with, employment in a coal mine.”  30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(4)(B).  
The ALJ concluded that Eighty Four Mining failed to 
adequately explain why Morris’s years of coal dust exposure 
were not a substantial cause of his pulmonary impairment.  
Accordingly, the ALJ found that Morris was entitled to an 
award of BLBA benefits. 
 Eighty Four Mining appealed to the Benefits Review 
Board.  On July 25, 2014, the Board affirmed the award of 
benefits to Morris, but it did so based on a theory of judicial 
estoppel.2  The Board determined that because Eighty Four 
                                              
2 Administrative Appeals Judge Roy Smith dissented 
from the Board’s decision, stating that he would have denied 
benefits because Morris’s claim was untimely and that it was 
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Mining had previously argued that Morris’s 2006 
pneumoconiosis diagnosis was incorrect, it was inconsistent 
for Eighty Four Mining to rely now on that diagnosis as 
triggering the federal statute of limitations..  Because judicial 
estoppel precluded Eighty Four Mining’s timeliness 
argument, the Board held that Morris’s claim was timely.  
The Board also concluded that the ALJ correctly rejected the 
opinions of Eighty Four Mining’s physicians that Morris’s 
pulmonary impairment was attributable only to smoking.  
Accordingly, the Board affirmed the benefits award.  Eighty 
Four Mining timely petitioned this Court for review of the 
Board’s decision, challenging only the ruling that Morris’s 
BLBA claim is timely.  
II. 
 We have jurisdiction over final orders from the 
Benefits Review Board under 33 U.S.C. § 921(c), as 
incorporated by 30 U.S.C. § 932(a).  Obush, 650 F.3d at 251 
n.4 (quoting Labelle Processing Co. v. Swarrow, 72 F.3d 308, 
310 (3d Cir. 1995)).  We exercise plenary review over 
questions of law.  Id. (citing Swarrow, 72 F.3d at 313).   
III. 
 Congress enacted the BLBA to “provide benefits . . . to 
coal miners who are totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis.” 
30 U.S.C. § 901(a).  Under the BLBA, “‘pneumoconiosis’ 
means a chronic dust disease of the lung and its sequelae, 
including respiratory and pulmonary impairments, arising out 
of coal mine employment.”  30 U.S.C. § 902(b).  The 
                                                                                                     
inappropriate to rely on judicial estoppel or Obush to 
determine otherwise.   
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legislation and implementing regulations explicitly 
acknowledge that pneumoconiosis is both a latent and a 
progressive disease.  See Consolidation Coal Co. v. Williams, 
453 F.3d 609, 616 (4th Cir. 2006) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 
718.201(c)).  In this respect, the legislation does not “bar 
claimants from filing claims seriatim, and the regulations 
recognize that many will.”  Id. (quoting Lisa Lee Mines v. 
Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 86 F.3d 1358, 
1362 (4th Cir. 1996)).   
While allowing for serial claims in light of the 
progressive nature of the disease, the legislation does impose 
a limitations period for filing a claim.  To maintain a timely 
BLBA claim, a miner must file a claim within three years of 
receiving a “medical determination” of pneumoconiosis.  See 
30 U.S.C. § 932(f).  This “medical determination” must be 
“communicated to the miner” before the statute of limitations 
will begin to run.  See 20 C.F.R. § 725.308(a).  Neither the 
legislation nor the implementing regulations, however, define 
the term “medical determination.”  See Arch of Ky., Inc. v. 
Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 556 F.3d 472, 481 
(6th Cir. 2009).  The question that arises is whether a 
diagnosis of pneumoconiosis that is rejected in an adjudicated 
proceeding nonetheless constitutes a “medical determination” 
that triggers the statute of limitations for bringing a claim for 
BLBA benefits.   
  In Obush, we answered that question in the negative, 
holding that the denial of an initial BLBA claim renders a 
prior pneumoconiosis diagnosis a “misdiagnosis” that will 
“reset the limitations clock as to subsequent claims.”  650 
F.3d at 253.  Specifically, we concluded as a matter of law 
that a medical diagnosis of pneumoconiosis rejected by an 
ALJ in a BLBA proceeding “cannot be a ‘medical 
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determination’ of pneumoconiosis, as set out in section 932.”  
Id. We reasoned that res judicata required us to accept a prior 
ALJ’s denial of black lung benefits as a determination that the 
claimant’s pneumoconiosis diagnosis was a “misdiagnosis.”  
Id. at 252 (discussing Swarrow, 72 F.3d at 314).  In so doing, 
we emphasized that “courts have repeatedly recognized that 
the remedial nature of the statute requires a liberal 
construction of the Black Lung entitlement program to ensure 
widespread benefits to miners and their dependents.”  Id. 
(quoting Keating v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. 
Programs, 71 F.3d 1118, 1122 (3d Cir. 1995)); see also 
Pavesi v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 758 F.2d 
956, 965 (3d Cir. 1985) (“[T]he Act must be applied in a 
manner which assures compensation to every miner who 
suffers from any of the several lung impairments covered by 
the Black Lung Benefits Act.”).  We also explained that the 
progressive nature of pneumoconiosis favors “reading the 
statute of limitations in an expansive manner to ensure that 
any miner . . . afflicted with the disease, including its 
progressive form, is given every opportunity to prove he is 
entitled to benefits.”  See Obush, 650 F.3d at 253.  Lastly, we 
opined that “a restrictive interpretation of the statute of 
limitations . . . would be in tension with the regulation that 
enables miners to file subsequent claims.”  Id.  “The very fact 
that successive claims are permitted—on evidence of material 
changes to the health of a miner—makes an interpretation of 
the statute of limitations that effectively precludes such 
claims untenable.”  Id.  
 Eighty Four Mining argues that Obush does not 
control the present case because Obush involved a subsequent 
federal claim after the initial diagnosis was repudiated in a 
federal proceeding, whereas the present case involves an 
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initial federal claim after the diagnosis of pneumoconiosis 
was repudiated by a workers’ compensation judge in a state 
proceeding.  This argument seizes upon Obush’s discussion 
of res judicata and ignores our statute of limitations analysis, 
which focuses on what constitutes a “medical determination” 
of pneumoconiosis.  We necessarily held in Obush that a 
rejected diagnosis is not a “medical determination.”  Thus, 
under Obush, a denial of BLBA benefits as a result of an 
adjudicator’s repudiation of the pneumoconiosis diagnosis 
resets the statute of limitations for subsequent claims, which 
begins to run again from a later diagnosis.  
The opinion of our dissenting colleague also overplays 
the role of res judicata in Obush.  The central holding of 
Obush is that a misdiagnosis does not start the limitations 
period—or, to put it another way, the statute of limitations 
resets upon discovery that an earlier diagnosis was a 
misdiagnosis, and the limitations period does not start again 
until a later diagnosis has been made.  Although the principles 
of res judicata were applied to hold that the rejection of the 
original diagnosis was final, the ultimate holding that the 
original diagnosis was not a “medical determination” for 
purposes of triggering the statute of limitations did not spring 
from the conclusive effect of the ALJ’s decision in the first 
proceeding.  Rather, Obush relied upon (a) the fundamental 
understanding that “the remedial nature of the statute requires 
a liberal construction of the Black Lung entitlement program 
to ensure widespread benefits to miners and their 
dependents,” see id. at 252 (quoting Keating, 71 F.3d at 
1122); (b) the recognition that “‘pneumoconiosis’ is . . . a 
latent and progressive disease which may first become 
detectable only after the cessation of coal mine dust 
exposure,” see id. at 253 (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 718.201); and 
 10 
 
(c) the fact that successive claims are permitted – “mak[ing] 
an interpretation of the statute of limitations that effectively 
precludes such claims untenable.”  See id.  As the Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals put it:  
The statute of limitations exists to 
promote the quick filing of 
worthy claims. It does not exist as 
a trap for the unwary or 
unsophisticated miner. Given the 
recognized ‘latent and 
progressive’ nature of the disease, 
20 C.F.R. § 718.201(c), a 
restrictive interpretation of 
‘medical diagnosis’ is 
unwarranted because it would, in 
effect, penalize a miner who 
sought a consultation too soon 
and received a determination from 
a physician who decided to err on 
the side of aggressive diagnosis. 
Holding the miner responsible for 
a genuine misdiagnosis unjustly 
holds him responsible for the 
principled medical judgment of a 
doctor, presumably far more 
skilled and educated than the 
miner.  
Arch of Ky., 556 F.3d at 482 (emphasis in original) (quotation 
marks and citation omitted).  
The question here is how to apply the central holding 
in Obush that a misdiagnosis does not constitute a “medical 
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determination” sufficient to trigger the statute of limitations—
that is, we must determine whether there has been a 
misdiagnosis that resets that statute of limitations.  The core 
concept behind the holding that a misdiagnosis resets the 
statute of limitations is that a miner presumably cannot self-
diagnose black lung disease—he must instead rely upon the 
expertise of those “presumably far more skilled and educated 
than the miner.”  See id. (quoting Peabody Coal Co. v. Dir., 
Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 48 F. App’x 140, 146 
(6th Cir. 2002)).  When a state adjudicator repudiates a 
diagnosis of black lung disease, a miner cannot himself 
determine the correctness of that conclusion.  To hold that the 
state adjudicator’s determination does not reset the statute of 
limitations would be to hold the miner responsible for 
determining not just whether his doctor made a correct 
diagnosis, but for determining whether the state adjudicator 
correctly determined that that diagnosis was incorrect. This 
“trap for the unwary or unsophisticated miner” is precisely 
the reason why a diagnosis repudiated in a contested 
adjudication does not trigger the statute of limitations.  See id.  
 Here, Morris’s state workers’ compensation claim was 
denied because the adjudicator repudiated his doctor’s 
diagnosis of pneumoconiosis.  Indeed, the state Workers’ 
Compensation Judge specifically concluded that Morris “did 
not sustain an injury . . . in the nature of coal workers’ 
pneumoconiosis or any other pulmonary injury.”  (App. 139.)  
The rejection of Dr. Cohen’s diagnosis is indistinguishable 
from the denial of the initial black lung benefits claim in 
Obush. 
 Thus, we hold that the rejection of a claim in which the 
adjudicator repudiates a medical determination of 
pneumoconiosis means that a subsequent claim filed within 
 12 
 
three years of receipt of a new medical determination 
establishing the existence of pneumoconiosis will not be 
barred as untimely, regardless of whether the first claim was 
filed under a state workers’ compensation law or under the 
BLBA.3  Our dissenting colleague is correct in pointing out 
that our decision today rests primarily on the liberal 
interpretation to be accorded the BLBA.  But so too did 
Obush rely upon that fundamental principle in holding that a 
“medical determination” of pneumoconiosis is not a “medical 
determination” for purposes of the statute of limitations when 
it is repudiated in an adjudicated BLBA proceeding.  To hold 
otherwise in this case would mean that Morris’s second claim 
would be timely if he had initially unsuccessfully sought 
BLBA benefits but is untimely because he first elected to 
pursue state workers’ compensation benefits.  Such a 
difference in result is untenable.  Indeed, given the latent and 
progressive nature of pneumoconiosis, an early diagnosis of 
the disease will often be deemed a misdiagnosis.  See 20 
C.F.R. § 718.201(c) (recognizing pneumoconiosis “as a latent 
and progressive disease which may first become detectable 
only after the cessation of coal mine dust exposure.”).  As we 
reasoned in Obush, this consideration supports “reading the 
                                              
 3 Because we are not relying on res judicata for our 
decision today, we need not address the state workers’ 
compensation board’s process and standards.  What matters is 
that the diagnosis of pneumoconiosis was repudiated, as our 
holding is merely that a workers' compensation judge's 
repudiation of a diagnosis of pneumoconiosis will reset the 
statute of limitations.  For this reason, our dissenting 
colleague’s fear that a ruling in favor of a miner in a state 
workers’ compensation proceeding would mandate a finding 
in favor of that miner in a BLBA proceeding is unfounded. 
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statute of limitations in an expansive manner to ensure that 
any miner who has been afflicted with the disease, including 
its progressive form, is given every opportunity to prove he is 
entitled to benefits.”  See 650 F.3d at 253.   
 In light of these considerations, it is immaterial that 
Morris’s first claim was filed under a state workers’ 
compensation law.  Rather, what matters is that Morris’s 
initial claim was denied on the basis that he did not have 
pneumoconiosis.  See Peabody Coal Co. v. Dir., Office of 
Workers’ Comp. Programs, 718 F.3d 590, 595 (6th Cir. 2013) 
[hereinafter Brigance] (“The misdiagnosis rule applies only 
‘if a miner’s claim is ultimately rejected on the basis that he 
does not have the disease.’”).  As a result, when Morris’s 
condition worsened and he filed a BLBA claim within three 
years of receiving a new medical determination of 
pneumoconiosis, his BLBA claim was timely.  Thus, we will 
affirm the Board’s award of benefits to Morris and deny 
Eighty Four Mining’s petition for review.4   
                                              
 4  As noted above, the Board did not rely upon Obush, 
but instead applied judicial estoppel to find that Morris’s 
claim was timely.  We reject the Board’s judicial estoppel 
rationale.  For judicial estoppel to apply, a litigant must have 
advanced irreconcilably inconsistent positions.  It is not 
irreconcilably inconsistent to argue both that a diagnosis was 
incorrect and that the diagnosis nevertheless starts the statute 
of limitations clock.  Cf. Brigance, 718 F.3d at 594 (“The 
limitations period begins to run when a medical determination 
of total disability due to pneumoconiosis is communicated to 
the miner. Whether the diagnosis is well-reasoned or 
otherwise accurate (whether the miner is in fact totally 
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IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for 
review and affirm the Department of Labor Benefits Review 
Board’s Decision and Order of July 25, 2014.   
                                                                                                     
disabled due to pneumoconiosis) is irrelevant for purposes of 
the statute of limitations.”). 
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Eighty Four Mining v. Director, OWCP, No. 14-3976. 
Nygaard, J., Dissenting.   
 
I. 
 
 I respectfully dissent.  The majority relies heavily on 
one aspect of the Obush opinion:  the courts’ long history of 
giving a liberal interpretation to the Black Lung Benefits Act 
(30 U.S.C. §§901-945) to fulfill the remedial nature of the 
law.  As the one who wrote the Obush opinion for the Court, I 
obviously have no problem with this general approach to 
interpreting the statute.  However, I part ways with the 
majority because it fails to account for the entire holding in 
Obush, and, because of that, it misapplies it here.   
 
 Obush does not support the majority’s holding that a 
Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Administrative Law 
Judge (ALJ) is competent to rule that a diagnosis of black 
lung disease is a misdiagnosis under the federal Black Lung 
Benefits Act.  Helen Mining v. Director OWCP (Obush), 650 
F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 2011).  Moreover, I can find no statutory or 
legal basis to give such authority to a Pennsylvania Workers’ 
Compensation ALJ.1  To the contrary, although section 421 of 
                                              
1 The majority’s reference to an opinion from the Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is misplaced.  Peabody Coal Co. 
v. Director, Office of Wokers’ Compensation Programs, U.S. 
Dept. of Labor, (Brigance) 718 F.3d 590 (6th Cir. 2013).  The 
court in Peabody granted the petition for review of the mining 
company, reversing the grant of benefits, because the miner 
sat on his federal rights while adjudicating his state claim.  Id. 
at 595.  Nothing in the court’s holding can be construed as 
concluding that the state adjudication of a claim is dispositive 
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the Black Lung Benefits Act (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 931) 
requires miners to file state workers’ compensation claims, 
the requirement applies only to miners in states where the 
Secretary of Labor has determined that it provides adequate 
coverage for disability or death due to pneumoconiosis.  To 
date, the Secretary has determined that no state program 
meets such requirements.  20 C.F.R. Part 722.  For these 
reasons, I must conclude that Charles Morris’ claim for black 
lung benefits, filed almost five years after he received a 
diagnosis of black lung disease, is time barred.  Accordingly, 
I would grant 84 Mining’s Petition and instruct the Board of 
Review to reverse the decision of the federal Administrative 
Law Judge who granted benefits to Charles Morris. 
 
II. 
 
 A federal ALJ’s decision on a miner’s claim for 
benefits under the federal Black Lung Benefits Act—if made 
pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 725.421(a) and  § 725.451-464—is 
res judicata.  20 C.F.R. §479(a); see also  Labelle Processing 
Co. v. Swarrow, 72 F.3d 308 (3d Cir. 1995).2  Therefore, 
claimants are estopped from re-litigating any factual findings 
                                                                                                     
for purposes of a federal claim.  To the contrary, as I discuss 
infra, the court made clear that the communication of a 
diagnosis alone is sufficient to trigger the statute of 
limitations.  Id. at 594.  
 
2 Of course, such a decision is subject to appeal to the 
Benefits Review Board (20 C.F.R. § 481), and following that, 
a judicial review by a federal Court of Appeals (20 C.F.R. § 
482(a)).   
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or legal determinations made in the adjudication of the claim.  
Swarrow, 72 F.3d at 314.  But, in cases where the ALJ 
discredits the underlying diagnosis and denies the claim for 
benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act, this decision is 
tantamount to a ruling that the diagnosis supporting the claim 
is a misdiagnosis.  Obush, 650 F.3d at 252.  Such 
misdiagnoses are legally insufficient to trigger the statute of 
limitations for subsequent claims.  Id.  As a result, the 
limitations clock is reset and claimants are able to bring a 
subsequent claim, pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 725.309(c), 
without running afoul of the three-year statute of limitations 
that applies to “any” claim.  Swarrow, 72 F.3d at 314.3   
 
 At issue here is whether the denial of a claim for 
benefits under Pennsylvania’s Workers’ Compensation 
program is res judicata such that—except as provided in 20 
C.F.R. §725.309—a claim filed under the Black Lung 
Benefits Act would be precluded.  I frame the question in this 
manner because in Obush we said “because we are required 
to respect the factual findings and legal conclusions in earlier 
adjudicated claims, we must accept an ALJ’s conclusion that 
a medical opinion offered in support of that claim is 
discredited.” Obush, 650 F.3d at 252.  Our reasoning was 
necessarily rooted in our precedent analyzing Congress’ 
provision for subsequent claims.  Labelle Processing Co. v. 
Swarrow, 72 F.3d 308 (3d Cir. 1995).   
 
                                              
3 Subsequent claims are regarded as such only if they are 
based on new evidence showing a material change in 
conditions.  Id.; 30 U.S.C.A. § 932; see also 20 C.F.R. § 
725.309(c). 
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 In Swarrow, the mining company argued that a miner’s 
subsequent claim was barred by the doctrine of res judicata 
because it was the same cause of action involving the same 
parties in which a final judgment had been made.  Id. at 313.  
We determined that Congress’ provision for a second claim 
did not violate res judicata because the second claim was not 
constituted merely of “more doctors” saying the same things 
and finding a “sympathetic ALJ.”  Id.  Instead, the second 
claim was premised on “a material change in conditions” 
from the first claim that asserted new facts giving rise to a 
new claim.  Id.  In Obush, we had no difficulty in determining 
that the subsequent claim was a material change in conditions 
because both the first and second claims were ruled upon by 
an ALJ of the U.S. Department of Labor, who ruled in both 
cases pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 725.451-464.  Moreover, there 
was no question that the ALJ’s decision to discredit the first 
diagnosis and deny that claim was made in accord with the 
regulations governing the evaluation of claims for black lung 
benefits (20 C.F.R §718,  §725) and with the precedent of the 
Board of Review.  Because of this, we had certainty that the 
second claim brought by Obush was, indeed, a new claim, 
premised on a material change in conditions from the first 
diagnosis.  Here, however, we have no such assurance.  
  
 We will presume, for purposes of this analysis, that the 
2008 Pennsylvania ALJ’s decision at issue here was 
consistent with the regulations and precedents controlling the 
Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation program, but the 
record is devoid of any evidence to assess whether relevant 
Pennsylvania regulations and precedent are in any way 
compatible with those governing claims for benefits under the 
Black Lung Act.  Although the ALJ admitted the state 
decision into the record, there is no evidence that the ALJ 
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engaged in any analysis of relevant Pennsylvania law or the 
decision itself.  Therefore, we cannot say with any certainty 
that the claim before us is, indeed, a new claim based on new 
facts.  The majority never addresses this lacuna in the record.  
It simply declares, by fiat, that the decision by the 
Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation ALJ is the same as a 
federal black lung ALJ’s decision, rendering the underlying 
diagnosis a misdiagnosis.  This assumption is particularly 
troubling in light of the Secretary of Labor’s own recent 
assessment that no state workers’ compensation program—
Pennsylvania included—is comparable to the federal black 
lung program.  20 C.F.R. Part 722.  However, even if such 
evidence were in the record, the majority would still have a 
fundamental problem that simply cannot be brushed aside by 
pointing to the remedial nature of the statute:  I see no way 
that the state adjudication could be res judicata as to the claim 
for federal Black Lung Act benefits.  
 
 The Pennsylvania ALJ decision is not a final decision 
on the merits of “the same cause of action, involving the same 
parties or their privies” as to any claim for benefits under the 
Black Lung Act.  Swarrow, 72 F.3d at 313.  This is by design.  
Because these are distinct claims, a miner—based on the 
same black lung diagnosis—is able to file, both, a claim for 
Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation benefits and a claim 
for federal black lung benefits:  proceeding with both even if 
one of them is ultimately denied.4  Although a denial of a 
Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation claim might be 
                                              
4 The statute anticipates the circumstance of a miner receiving 
both workers’ compensation benefits and black lung benefits, 
providing for an offset.  30 U.S.C. § 932(g).   
 
6 
 
relevant to a federal black lung claim that is based on the 
same diagnosis, the disposition of the Pennsylvania claim 
does not prevent or resolve the federal claim.  See Schegan v. 
Waste Mgmt & Processors, Inc., 18 BLR 1-41 (1994); Clark 
v. Karst-Robbins Coal Co., 12 BLR 1-149 (1989)(en banc). 5  
   
 Precisely because the denial of a claim for 
Pennsylvania benefits that is based on a black lung diagnosis 
does not prevent or resolve a contemporaneous claim for 
federal black lung benefits based on the same diagnosis, there 
is no way that the Pennsylvania ALJ’s determination can 
serve as a conclusive ruling as to any other federal black lung 
claim that may be filed later.  This is the logical consequence 
of our ruling in Swarrow and Obush.  Therefore, I disagree 
with the majority.   The decision of the Pennsylvania 
Workers’ Compensation ALJ to deny Morris’ claim for 
workers’ compensation benefits is not tantamount to a ruling 
that the underlying diagnosis of black lung disease is a 
misdiagnosis.  
 
 The implications of my conclusion are clear and direct.  
“Any claim for benefits by a miner under this section shall be 
filed within three years after . . . a medical determination of 
total disability due to pneumoconiosis.”  30 U.S.C.A. § 932; 
                                              
5 It is not a “trap” for unsophisticated miners to hold that 
claiming eligibility for benefits under a Pennsylvania 
Workers’ Compensation program is fundamentally different, 
by definition, from claiming eligibility for benefits under the 
Black Lung Benefits Act.  Indeed, this is precisely what the 
Board of Review’s own precedent declares, a conclusion that 
is reaffirmed by the Secretary of Labor’s continuous 
conclusion that the benefits are not synonymous.   
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see also 20 C.F.R. § 725.308.  Therefore, any diagnosis of 
black lung that is “communicated to a miner or a person 
responsible for the care of the miner” (20 C.F.R. 725.308) 
triggers the statute of limitation for a claim of benefits to be 
filed under the Black Lung Benefits Act. Peabody Coal Co. 
(Brigance), 718 F.3d at 594 (“Construing the text of the 
statute as written, we hold that when a diagnosis of total 
disability due to pneumoconiosis by a physician trained in 
internal and pulmonary medicine is communicated to the 
miner, a “medical determination” sufficient to trigger the 
running of the limitations period has been made. No more is 
required.”).  The statute makes no provision for a miner to file 
a distinct claim after the expiration of that statute of limitation 
unless the merits of a timely filed claim for benefits under the 
Black Lung Benefits Act have been conclusively, 
affirmatively ruled upon.  See 20 C.F.R. § 725.309.  The 
statute of limitation clock is reset only after such a federal 
claim has been denied, rendering the underlying diagnosis a 
misdiagnosis.  Obush, 650 F.3d at 253.6  Since the state ALJ’s 
decision does not have any conclusive effect upon subsequent 
federal claims, and it is not tantamount to a ruling (for 
purposes of a federal claim) that the underlying diagnosis is a 
misdiagnosis, the state ALJ’s decision does not reset the 
statute of limitations clock under the federal Black Lung 
Benefits Act for purposes of a subsequent federal black lung 
claim.   
 
 In this case, a diagnosis of black lung disease was 
communicated to Charles Morris in 2006.  Because he did not 
                                              
6 See supra discussion of section 421 of the Black Lung 
Benefits Act. 
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file any federal claim under the Black Lung Benefits Claims 
Act within the following three-year window, he is now time 
barred from raising any other claim.   
 
 As I stated above, I have no issue with the general 
orientation of the courts to interpret the statute liberally in 
order to give effect to the statute’s remedial nature.   
However, we have an obligation to make such interpretations 
in a manner that respects the structure provided by Congress 
and the United States Department of Labor.  In Obush, our 
liberal interpretation of the statute served not only to extend 
remediation to Obush, but also to preserve the claim structure 
established by Congress and the Secretary of Labor.  We 
noted that a strict interpretation of the statute of limitations of 
the Black Lung Benefits Act would have eviscerated the 
statute’s provision for subsequent claims, since any claim 
would have to have been filed within three years of the initial 
diagnosis.  Id.  
 
  In this case, the majority’s interpretation of Obush 
would actually impair the claim structure established by 
statute and regulation, and potentially render meaningless 
years of precedent established by the Review Board on the 
determination of disability under the Act.  This is so because, 
if the majority’s interpretation is taken to its logical 
conclusion, a Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation ALJ 
decision to award benefits would also have conclusive effect, 
mandating an award of black lung benefits regardless of the 
federal requirements set out at law.  The majority’s over-
reliance on the remedial nature of the statute in this case 
produces a result that is not only unsupported by the statute, 
by our precedent, or by the record of this case; it is a holding 
that could potentially unravel the statutory and regulatory 
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scheme for black lung claims.  Therefore, as I stated above, I 
must disagree with the majority and conclude that a decision 
of a state workers’ compensation ALJ cannot be sufficient to 
reset the statute of limitation for a federal black lung claim.   
 
 It is clear that the Benefits Review Board also had 
some issue with the ALJ’s reasoning, because it chose to 
uphold the award of benefits on alternative grounds.  (App. at 
A11).  It did not state its reasons for doing so, but it is fair to 
assume that the Board was aware of the conflict the ALJ’s 
interpretation of Obush created with its own precedent in 
Schegan and Clark v. Karst-Robbins Coal Co., which 
explicitly provides that state findings are not binding upon 
these federal proceedings.  Beyond that, however, I will not 
speculate on why the Board took a different path to affirm the 
award of benefits.  Nonetheless, consistent with the 
conclusion of the majority,7 I, too, disagree with the Board’s 
alternative reasoning that grounded its denial of 84 Mining’s 
appeal on the basis of judicial estoppel.   
 
III. 
 
 The Board ruled that 84 Mining was estopped from 
relying upon the 2006 black lung diagnosis to argue that 
Morris was time barred here.  The rationale for their decision 
was that, in the Pennsylvania claim, 84 Mining argued the 
2006 diagnosis of totally disabling pneumoconiosis was 
wrong, and that it is now inconsistent for it to assert “that this 
same report . . . which employer previously claimed, and 
established, was incorrect, supports a claim for work-related 
injury and should have been acted upon my claimant.” (App. 
                                              
7 See supra, majority opinion footnote 4. 
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at A11).  84 Mining makes no such assertion.  Judicial 
estoppel “generally prevents a party from prevailing in one 
phase of a case on an argument and then relying on a 
contradictory argument to prevail in another phase.”  MD 
Mall Associates, LLC v. CSX Transp., Inc., 715 F.3d 479, 487 
(3d Cir. 2013), as amended (May 30, 2013) (quoting New 
Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749 (2001).  84 Mining 
claimed in the Pennsylvania case what it claims now:  that the 
2006 diagnosis is incorrect.  84 Mining is not making an 
argument that contradicts an earlier position.  Rather, it 
argues precisely the same point that I raise above:  a 
Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation ALJ is not competent 
to rule, for purposes of the Black Lung Benefits Act, that the 
2006 diagnosis is a misdiagnosis.  Such a determination is 
only within the competence of those authorized by the Black 
Lung Benefits Act.  It was up to Morris to obtain such a 
ruling and he did not do so.  There is no inconsistency here.   
 
 Finally, I disagree with the Review Board that a 
miscarriage of justice was avoided by the grant of benefits 
here.  (App. at A11).  After Morris received the denial of his 
Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation claim in 2008, he still 
had roughly one year left before the federal statute of 
limitation expired on his black lung claim.  I sympathize with 
the sentiment, alleged by Morris in his briefs, that—
essentially—it would have been a waste of time to pursue a 
second claim based on a diagnosis that already had been 
discredited by a Pennsylvania adjudication.  However, it is 
undeniable that the federal statute and regulations gave 
Morris a second opportunity for relief after Pennsylvania 
denied his claim.  It is certainly unfortunate, but hardly a 
miscarriage of justice, that Morris chose to sit on his rights 
and refrain from filing a claim for federal black lung benefits.  
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IV. 
 
 For all of these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the 
majority.  I would conclude that Morris’ claim is time barred.  
Accordingly, I would have granted the Petition for Review 
and instructed the Review Board to reverse the grant of 
benefits ordered by the Administrative Law Judge.    
